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Globalization is not only about the rise of trade, FDI, and migration. It is also about the changing 
linkages among these flows. The main findings of the paper can be summarized as follows. First, at 
least in the nineties,  import trade liberalization fostered not only trade but also inward investment, 
confirming that trade and FDI toward developing countries have become  largely complements. 
Second,  the presence of a skilled labour force is a relevant factor to attract FDI. Moreover, trade 
policies and the stock of FDI have a positive impact on the incentives to invest in education. This 
set of findings highlights the possibility of a low equilibrium trap where the lack of human capital 
discourages FDI and inadequate investment from abroad limits the domestic incentives to acquire 
education. Rich countries, by encouraging skilled immigration from relatively poor countries, are 
definitely aggravating such a risk. Third, we find little evidence supporting the contrary argument of 
a brain gain, where the possibility for skilled workers to migrate abroad raises the return to 
education and the investment in human capital. Overall, our results highlight the need to study 
globalization in a fully integrated way, not just as the sum of its different components. They also 
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Non technical Abstract 
 
International economic integration has been on the rise since at least the mid eighties. However, the 
present episode of globalization has a number of distinctive features that makes it more vulnerable 
to a turnaround in even one of its components. First and foremost, the nature of foreign direct 
investment, particularly toward developing and emerging markets, has changed. In the past, FDI 
was mainly directed to establish a production facility in foreign markets with a view to catering to 
foreign consumers and circumventing restrictions to trade. More recently, however, the investment 
decisions by international firms seems to be increasingly driven by the desire to cut production 
costs by slicing the value added chain among affiliates in different locations as a function of relative 
factor prices. Hence, trade costs  happen to play a very different role in this context. They no longer 
encourage multinational firms to invest abroad with a view to getting better access to foreign 
consumers. Quite to the contrary, their impact is to increase the costs attendant on the fragmentation 
of the value added chain and discourage therefore firms from investing abroad. In other words, 
trade and FDI have increasingly become complements. As a result, any step back in either 
dimension would reflect negatively on the other.  
Similar considerations apply to the link between trade and migration. The two have typically been 
seen as substitutes. The creation of NAFTA was indeed hailed by then President Salinas as 
reflecting the desire of his country “to export goods not people”. This relationship may still hold 
true, but increasingly less so. In particular, the growth in service trade, one of the most dynamic 
component in the expansion of international trade, is very much dependent on the ability to supply 
such services in loco through the firm’s own personnel and is therefore positively linked to 
migration. Once again, therefore, restriction on one component of globalization – say immigration - 
carry negative implication for other facets – trade in services - of the process.  
 
The main findings of the paper can be summarized as follows. First, while trade and FDI policies 
have become steadily more liberal throughout the world, immigration policies in receiving countries 
have grown quite restrictive. Only for skilled workers has immigration policy in the main receiving 
countries become more generous, raising fears among sending countries of a brain drain. Second, at 
least in the nineties,  import trade liberalization fostered not only trade but also inward investment, 
confirming that trade and FDI toward developing countries have been, most recently,  largely 
complements. Third, the presence of a skilled labour force is a relevant factor to attract FDI. 
Moreover, trade policies and the stock of FDI have a positive impact on the incentives to acquire 
education. This set of findings highlights the possibility of a low equilibrium trap where the lack of 
human capital discourages FDI and inadequate investment from abroad limits the domestic 
incentives to acquire education. Rich countries, by encouraging skilled immigration from relatively 
poor countries, would be definitely aggravating such a risk. Fourth, we find little evidence 
supporting the contrary argument of a brain gain, where the possibility for skilled workers to 
migrate abroad raises the return to education and the investment in human capital.  
 






International economic integration has been on the rise since at least the mid eighties. Trade in 
goods and services has been one key component in the process. While world GDP rose on average 
by 3.8% between 1985 and 2000, world exports expanded at a substantially faster rate during the 
same period, 6.1% on an average annual basis. The growth in trade did not come at the expense of 
reduced factor mobility, as traditional trade theory would typically imply. Between 1985 and 2000, 
real foreign direct investment increased at an average annual rate of 17.7%. The stock of inward 
FDI rose from 8.4 % of world GDP in 1985 to 22.3 % in 2002. Even migration, in many respects 
the grand absentee of the present globalization episode, played a non negligible role in fostering 
international integration. In the US, for instance, the stock of foreign born population increased 
from 6.2% of  total population in 1980 to 10.4% in 2000.  
 
Yet, more recently,  there have been signs that globalization is retreating. FDI fell markedly by 41% 
in 2001 and again by 20% in 2002. International trade virtually stagnated in 2001 and failed to 
rebound in 2002. The volume of merchandise trade actually fell in industrial countries. A key 
question is whether  this is simply a cyclical phenomenon, reflecting the global economic 
slowdown, or whether it carries more worrisome implications.  
 
Clearly, it is too early to tell. What we can say however is that the present episode of globalization 
has a number of distinctive features that makes it more vulnerable to a turnaround in even one of its 
components. First and foremost, the nature of foreign direct investment, particularly toward 
developing and emerging markets, has changed. In the past, FDI was mainly directed to establish a 
production facility in foreign markets with a view to catering to foreign consumers and 
circumventing restrictions to trade. Accordingly, an increase in trade barriers would have been 
associated with a rise in FDI. By and large, therefore, trade and FDI were substitutes. More 
recently, however, the investment decisions by international firms seems to be increasingly driven 
by a different set of considerations. Improvements in communication and transportation technology 
allow firms to achieve substantial cost reductions by slicing the value added chain among affiliates 
in different locations as a function of factor prices. Hence, trade costs  play a very different role in 
this context. They no longer encourage multinational firms to invest abroad with a view to getting 
better access to foreign consumers. Quite to the contrary, their impact is to increase the costs   3
attendant on the fragmentation of the value added chain and discourage therefore firms from 
investing abroad. In other words, trade and FDI have become increasingly complements. As a 
result, any step back in either dimension would reflect negatively on the other. In particular, 
increasing trade restrictions would not only depress trade, but also negative reflect on the incentives 
to undertake FDI.  
 
Similar considerations apply to the link between trade and migration. The two have typically been 
seen as substitutes. The creation of NAFTA was indeed hailed by then President Salinas as 
reflecting the desire of his country “to export goods not people”. This relationship may still hold 
true, but increasingly less so. In particular, the growth in service trade, one of the most dynamic 
component in the expansion of international trade, is very much dependent on the ability to supply 
such services in loco through the firm’s own personnel and is therefore positively linked to 
migration. Once again, therefore, restrictions on one component of globalization – say immigration 
- carry negative implication for other facets – trade in services - of the process.  
 
These considerations have substantive implications for both policy and research. At the academic 
level,  they highlight the need to study globalization in a fully integrated way, not just as the sum of 
its different components. Separate analyses of trade, FDI, and migration would not do the job. Even 
bivariate studies of the link say between trade and migration or between trade and FDI may miss the 
full picture. We know little either empirically or theoretically about the links between FDI and 
migration. We know even less about the intricate relationships that tie together trade, foreign direct 
investment, and migration.  
 
From a policy point of view, the need for policy coherence becomes paramount. Restricting trade 
may be detrimental to the ability to attract FDI. Similarly, limiting migration may discourage FDI 
and depress trade. Unfortunately, policy coordination is weak, particularly in developing countries, 
with key decisions affecting trade, inward FDI, and migration policies often being taken by 
different public bodies. Policy coherence is also particularly inadequate at the international level. 
Coordination among international institutions is the exception rather than the rule. Also, there is no 
international institution in charge of migration issues. Similarly, attempts to define a set of 
multilateral rules for FDI have completely floundered and have all but been abandoned. Finally, the 
drive to coordinate aid, trade, and capital flows policies have so far yielded no tangible results.  
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly reviews the major 
trends in international economic integration since the early nineties. We focus on trade, FDI, and 
migration. We also look at policies. We find that while trade and FDI policies have become steadily 
more liberal throughout the world, immigration policies in receiving countries have grown quite 
restrictive, particularly in Europe. Only for skilled workers has immigration policy in the main 
receiving countries become more generous, a trend however that has raised considerable concerns 
among developing countries afraid of losing their best and most educated talents.  
 
These trends carry substantive implication for the ability of developing and emerging markets to 
fully benefit from globalization. Trade liberalization across the world should foster trade, boost 
openness and encourage FDI. We test these conjectures in section 3. As expected, we find  that, at 
least in the nineties,  import trade liberalization fostered both trade and inward investment. At the 
same time, we also find that the presence of a skilled labour force is a relevant factor to attract FDI. 
In section 4, therefore, we take a close look at the determinants of the investment in human capital 
in developing countries. We seek to assess whether, in addition to more traditional determinants,  
also trade policies and the stock of FDI have a positive impact on the incentives to acquire 
education. We find that this is indeed the case, suggesting the possibility of a low equilibrium trap 
where the lack of human capital discourages FDI and inadequate investment from abroad limits the 
domestic incentives to acquire education. Rich countries, by encouraging skilled immigration from 
relatively poor countries, would be definitely aggravating such a risk. Developing countries are 
therefore right to be concerned about the negative growth implications of the brain drain.  
 
However, the case could be made that the brain drain is not necessarily a curse for sending 
countries
1. It may well be that the opening up of industrial countries borders to skilled migration 
from the developing world raises the return to education there, thereby boosting investment in 
human capital. Under these conditions, trade liberalization, FDI, and the brain drain would no 
longer work at cross purpose, but would be mutually reinforcing. Trade liberalization and the brain 
drain would both be associated with a larger flow of FDI. This is because the sheer ability to 
migrate abroad would boost the incentive in education, potentially raising the domestic supply of 
skilled workers  and in the end triggering an even larger flow of foreign direct investment. We 
assess the empirical plausibility of this argument in section 5.  The available evidence suggests that 
this rosy scenario is somewhat unlikely. Overall, while the results can only be seen as preliminary, 
                                                 
1 See for instance Stark et al. (1997, 1998), Mountford  (19978) and Beine et al. (2001, 2003),    5
nonetheless they clearly indicate the need to examine the effects of trade, FDI, and migration 






2. Trade and factor mobility: trends and policies 
 
The key facts of globalization have all been well documented elsewhere and need only to be briefly 
recalled here.  Between 1985 and 2000 world real GDP increased at an average annual rate of 3.8%. 
During the same period, real exports increased at an average rate of 6.1% and real FDI flows by 
17.7%. As a result, the share of both exports and FDI in world GDP increased substantially (figure 
1). Migration also expanded, but at a substantially slower pace. Cross country comparisons of 
migration data are marred by definitional problems. Yet, available evidence shows that migrants 
stocks, as a percentage of population, have been rising relatively slowly for the main receiving 
countries and, in a number of cases, have even declined (table 1).  
 
For the purpose of this paper, the key fact is the expanding role of developing countries.  Their 
share in world exports has increased quite rapidly, particularly in the nineties, largely driven by the 
exceptional performance of Asia (figure 2). Developing countries are also playing an increasingly 
relevant role as host of FDI. While foreign direct investment goes predominantly to developed 
countries, the share of developing countries has been rising since the late eighties. It fell in the 
aftermath of the Asian crisis but has been recovering since, albeit at a slow pace (fig. 3). Perhaps 
more crucially, developing countries have witnessed a substantial rise in their exposure to the 
international economy. Figures 4 and 5 give the regional details for trade and FDI respectively. 
From figure 4 we see how trade openness – defined as the sum of imports and exports over GDP - 
has risen steadily in Asia, developing Europe, and Latin America. The picture for Africa is a bit less 
univocal and so is that of the Middle East, despite the fact that openness is measured at constant 
prices and hence is not affected by gyrations in commodity prices. Foreign direct investment also 
shows a rising trend as a percentage of host country GDP (fig. 5). With the exception of the Middle 
East, inward foreign direct investment has surged in all regions and now accounts for about 4% of 
GDP in Africa, Asia, developing Europe and Latin America. Contrary to widespread beliefs, Africa 
has also benefited from the rapid expansion in FDI. Its low share in world FDI simply reflects its   6
low share in world GDP. Finally, the substantial increase in FDI to Latin America is partly the 
mirror image of the large scale privatization program during the nineties.  
 
A more liberal policy stance has been instrumental in opening up the economies of developing 
countries. In fig. 6, we see how over the last twenty years tariff barriers have been declining quite 
significantly in most developing regions, from 33% to 20% in Africa, from 35% to 15% in Asia and 
from 30% to 13% in Latin America. Developing Europe, a relatively latecomer to the globalization 
process, also managed to halve its average tariff rate from 20% to 10%. The noticeable exception to 
this fairly general trend is the Middle East where tariff barriers increased from 13% in the early 
eighties to 16% in the late nineties. Turning to non tariff barriers, they have also declined for most 
developing countries.  Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2004) have computed the tariff equivalent value 
of both core and non core NTBs for three selected years during the nineties (figure 7). Perhaps, the 
most striking finding is that, on average, non tariff barriers do not restrict trade as much as 
commonly thought. In all cases, their ad valorem equivalents are below 10%. Only for Latin 
America and the Middle East they are actually close to such value. For Africa, Asia and developing 
Europe they stand at much lower levels, around 2-4%.  
 
Summing up so far, two facts stand out. First, tariff barriers are still relatively high in many 
developing countries, but have been on a downward trend since the early eighties, with the only 
noticeable exception of the Middle East. Second, non tariff barriers do not restrict trade 
significantly, as measured at least by their tariff equivalent values.  
 
Turning to barriers with respect to FDI, the general picture of a more liberal regime still holds. 
Restrictive measures are more difficult to quantify in this area. Nonetheless, UNCTAD has 
maintained a headcount of FDI measures and classifies them according to whether they represent a 
move toward a more or less liberal regime. The trend is definitely toward a more open policy 
regime with liberalizing measures outranking restrictive ones by a factor of 10. 
 
Last but not least, the stance on migration policy stands in sharp contrast with the increasingly 
liberal attitude with respect to trade and FDI. Indeed, since 1974, most industrial countries have 
tried to restrict new immigration and, at the same time, favour the return of previous immigrants. 
While many of these policies have only been partly successful, they have nonetheless succeeded in 
slowing down the flow of immigrants that had characterized the post war period. More recently, in 
response to the growing shortage of skilled workers, most receiving countries have tried to shift the   7
focus of their immigration policy, with the view to favouring the recruitment of highly skilled 
workers. This new twist in the policy stance toward immigration has become a source of 
considerable concern in traditionally sending countries, that are afraid of losing their most skilled 
and entrepreneurial workers. Unfortunately, empirical evidence on the determinants and the size of 
the brain drain is quite limited. The gap has been partly filled by the work of Carrington and 
Detragiache (1998). Using the US census on the educational and the geographical origin of 
immigrants into the US and combining this information with the Barro-Lee data set on the level of 
educational achievements in sending countries, they are able to estimate migration rates for 
different educational groups. Their main finding is that skilled migration can represent a significant 
drain at least for some developing countries. Table 2 reports migration rates for secondary and 




3. Trade and factor mobility: the most recent trends 
 
The rapid growth in trade and FDI came to a sudden stop in 2001. The fall in FDI was massive, 
minus 41% in nominal terms. Fortunately enough, there was no collapse in world trade, but the 
volume of trade was virtually unchanged with respect to the previous year. Matters did not improve 
much in 2002. FDI fell again, this time by 20%. The recovery in trade was modest, 3.2%, basically 
in line with the growth in world output. The prospects for 2003 are not particularly bright, with 
growth in trade projected to stay once again below that of world output.  
 
Largely, the slowdown in the pace of globalization can be attributed to the slowdown of the global 
economy and, to a lesser extent, to the correction of the financial excesses in the late nineties. Yet, 
comparisons with earlier periods suggest that the fluctuations of the world economy cannot fully 
explain what happened to trade and FDI in 2001-2003. For the purpose of comparison, we look at 
the 1991-1993 slowdown, when world output growth stood at 3% as it did in 2001-2003. We find 
that world trade increased by only 3.9% in 1991 but then recovered quite rapidly to 9.5% and 11.4% 
in the two following years. As we have just seen, there has been no such recovery of trade in the 
current slowdown. Similarly, FDI fell in 1991, by 20%, but then recovered very rapidly in 1992 and 
particularly so in 1993 when its rate growth stood at around 30%. As argued by UNCTAD (2003), 
what is of concern today therefore is not only the downturn’s severity but also its duration.  
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These concerns should not be overblown. The fall in world FDI reflects the collapse in mergers and 
acquisitions, itself linked to the decline in the stock markets. Moreover, data for 2003 seem to 
indicate a bottoming out of the FDI cycle. Yet, the fact remains that trade,  a component not too 
prone to financial excesses, fell relatively more, and was relatively slower to recover, compared to 
previous slowdowns.  
 
The policy stance is an additional source of concern. The failure of the Cancun ministerial meeting 
and the collapse of the negotiations for a multilateral agreement on investment provide an hefty 
reminder that the trend toward more open policies should not be taken for granted. We also know 
from history that globalization is not an irreversible process, driven by the forces of technology. 
Policy matters, even more so in a context where, as noticed earlier, complementarities among the 
different facets of globalization play an increasingly relevant role. Failure to liberalize trade, or 
worse a retreat from current trade policies, would not only depress the expansion of trade flows, but 
could well undermine also the incentives for capital and labour mobility.  
 
 
4. Trade liberalization, trade flows and factor mobility  
 
There is considerable disagreement in the literature as to the growth effects of a more liberal trade 
regime. A key difficulty is whether the stance of the trade regime should be measured by an output 
indicator, such as the relative size of trade flows, or more directly by a an index of trade policy. The 
former are easier to compute, but do not necessarily provide a good measure of the trade policy 
stance as they reflect the influence of many confounding factors. The latter are harder to get and 
typically perform less well in empirical analyses. Still, until very recently, the conventional wisdom 
was that trade openness, whether measured by an output or a policy indicator, was positively 
associated with per capita income growth. However, an influential paper by Rodriguez and Rodrik 
(2000) showed that standard wisdom was, as it often happens, less conclusive than commonly 
thought. Not only were traditional measures of trade openness very imperfect indicators of the 
actual stance of trade policy, but, more crucially, trade restrictions, compared to other unsound 
policies, were found to play a relatively minor role in determining the growth performance across 
countries. More recently, though, Wacziarg and Welch (2003), while confirming most of the early 
findings of Rodriguez and Rodrik, showed that, in a time series context, properly identified trade 
liberalization episodes have a positive and robust effect on growth and investment.  
   9
 
a) trade policy and trade flows 
 
For the purpose of this paper, the key finding of Wacziarg and Welch (2003) is that trade policy 
measures are indeed associated with greater trade openness, measured by the sum of exports and 
imports over GDP. This result supports the view that typically the effects of trade liberalization are 
not negated by offsetting measures or by poor implementation. We assess the robustness of the 
findings by Wacziarg and Welch (2003) by adding to their regression a number of structural factors, 
namely per capita GDP and total population, with a view to capturing the impact of economic 
development and size on openness. Trade policy is simply measured by an indicator of tariff 
barriers compiled by the World Bank. We ran the following simple five year regression over the 
eighties and the nineties (1981-85, 1986-90, 1991-95, 1996-2000) for a large sample (92) of 
developing countries: 
 





pc ln ln      (1) 
 
where X, M and Y denote exports, imports and GDP while Ypc, Pop and τ represent per capita 
income, total population, and tariff barriers. Details about estimation methods and data sources are 
relegated to the appendix. Suffice to say here that, in an effort to cope with endogeneity problems,  
explanatory variables are equal to their  value at the beginning of each five year period, while the 
dependent variable is averaged over the whole period. Also, as an indicator of τ we use both the 
level of import duties and its log. As expected, we find that openness is positively associated with 
income per capita and negatively related to population (table 3), confirming the view that rich and 
small economies tend to trade relatively more. Furthermore, trade policy also affects quite 
significantly, both in statistical and quantitative terms, the level of openness. A 10 per cent decline 
in the level of tariff is associated with a 2 per cent increase in the level of openness.  
 
Summing up, a more liberal trade stance will positively affect openness, even after controlling for 





                                                 
2 Had we not controlled for the structural determinants of openness (income per capita, and population) the impact of 
tariffs would have been substantially larger. See Frankel and Rose (2000) for a similar result.    10
b) trade policy and foreign direct investment 
 
We can now turn to the relationship between trade policy and inward foreign direct investment. 
Unfortunately, theory  does not provide a clear-cut answer as to the direction of such a link. 
Consider first the standard model of trade. An increase in tariff barriers will typically depress both 
exports and imports. In a capital poor country, it will also raise the returns to capital and hence 
attract investment from abroad. This is the standard substitutability results between trade and factor 
mobility. Conversely, the lifting of trade restrictions should boost trade and discourage factor 
mobility. Interestingly enough, even less orthodox models come to similar conclusions. Consider 
for instance the product cycle paradigm. Initially, the new product will be exported by the 
innovating firm. However, once production becomes routine, it will be moved to a foreign location, 
where production costs are cheaper. Therefore, here too FDI is viewed as replacing trade.  
 
The models above basically fit the description of horizontal FDI, where the shift of production to a 
foreign location is motivated by the desire to circumvent trade barriers, save on trade costs and gain 
access to foreign consumers. Even in this set-up, however, the medium term link between trade and 
FDI is not unambiguous. As noticed by UNCTAD (1996), for instance, foreign affiliates typically 
generate a steady demand for imports of capital and intermediate goods from their parent firm. In 
the medium run therefore, following the investment abroad,  trade flows may grow rather than 
contract. However, it is still true that trade will grow less compared to the case where the firm had 
not established a production platform abroad. Accordingly, the prediction that trade barriers will 
depress trade and encourage market seeking FDI still holds.  
 
Market seeking inward FDI is certainly not the rule for most developing countries, given the small 
size of their markets. A perhaps more relevant motivation of inward FDI has been the desire to 
exploit the availability of natural resources in host countries. Resource seeking FDI is typically 
trade creating. Multinational firms will mostly cater to consumers in their home country or in third 
markets. Indeed, the main motivation of resource seeking FDI is to produce for exports rather than 
for host country consumption. The key observation here is that trade barriers are unlikely to matter 
much. Compared to manufacturing firms, primary sector affiliates are less dependent on the imports 
of intermediate goods. They are also unlikely to face major barriers in export markets. At any rate, 
trade barriers in the host country are unlikely to be a determining factor in the location decision of 
resource seeking FDI. Even imports of capital goods are typically taxed at very favourable rates if   11
not totally exempted. Accordingly, the prediction is that trade barriers should not have a substantive 
effect on resource seeking FDI. 
 
It is also worth noting that this form of FDI has been steadily losing relevance. For instance, exports 
by US primary sector affiliates as a percentage of host countries exports of primary goods has 
declined from 35 per cent in 1977 to 11.2% in the early nineties (UNCTAD, 1996). This trend 
mostly reflect the policies of indigenization of primary sectors by host countries. Moreover, the 
primary sector itself has lost much ground  as a source of foreign exchange for the developing 
world. Indeed, in the early nineties, the primary sector accounted for more than 22% of the stock of 
inward FDI in developing countries, but during that decade only less than 9% of the total flow of 
inward FDI went to that sector.  
 
Efficiency seeking, or vertical, FDI represents a further motivation for the firm decision to locate in 
foreign country. The aim is simple, namely to cut production costs by slicing the value added chain 
and relocating abroad the production of those intermediate goods which are too costly to produce 
domestically. The implications for trade are immediate: efficiency seeking FDI is trade creating. 
Transactions within the firm or among firms in the home country are replaced by trade between the 
parent firm and its affiliates. Quite often, moreover, affiliates will start selling to firms other than 
their parent. Similarly, the role of trade barriers changes radically. Pervasive restrictions to trade in 
the host country would raise the costs of vertical disintegration between the parent firms and its 
affiliates abroad. Hence, trade barriers discourage vertical FDI.  
 
To sum up, we have distinguished three types of motivations for FDI, with altogether different 
implications for both trade and for the impact of trade barriers. First, horizontal FDI substitutes for 
trade and is generally fostered by high trade barriers in host countries. Second, resource seeking 
FDI augments trade but is relatively insensitive to trade barriers in host countries. Finally, vertical 
FDI is also trade creating, but is highly responsive to trade barriers
3.  
 
These are all testable implications. They require however that we are able to distinguish between 
these three forms of FDI. Unfortunately, this is a tall task, one reason being that most often 
aggregate data include all three types of investment. Moreover, even for firm level data the different 
                                                 
3 A further source of complementarity between trade and FDI may stem from the growing role of services. Particularly 
for LDCs, inward FDI in marketing and services is complementary to their ability to exports. This further strengthens 
the argument that during the nineties FDI and trade in developing countries have become strong complements to each 
other.    12
kinds of motivations can all be present at the very same time. Nonetheless, there are indications of a 
negative relationship between trade costs and vertical FDI once data series are extended to cover  
the nineties (Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004). For instance, Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter 
(2001) find a negative relationship between the host country’s trade costs and both the ratio of 




In what follows, we take a very simple route. We start from the observation that resource seeking 
FDI has been somewhat on a downward trend, at least in relative terms. We also note that vertical 
FDI has been gaining importance, even with respect to market seeking FDI. Indirect evidence in 
this respect comes from the fact the average export propensity of US majority owned manufacturing 
affiliates in developing countries has been steadily rising from 8.4% in the mid sixties to 22% in the 
early eighties and to 39% in the mid nineties. The biggest rises have been in Latin America and 
developing Asia. In Asia’s newly industrializing economies, the exports propensity of US affiliates 
has actually declined, albeit from very high levels, most likely reflecting the expanding size of the 
host countries domestic markets. Again, we see that a sharp distinction between horizontal and 
vertical FDI is hard to draw. Yet, these data, taken together, point to the growing role of vertical 
FDI. If so, then, we would expect trade barriers to increasingly discourage FDI to developing 
countries, particularly in the nineties.  
 
We test this proposition in a simple manner. First, we take the UNCTAD measure of FDI 
attractiveness. This is basically a simple average of the scores achieved by different countries on a 
number of indicators that are deemed to attract FDI
5. They key observation here is that the 
UNCTAD FDI potential index does not include trade barriers. We therefore ran the following 
simple regression: 
 
γτ β α + + = PI
Y
FDI
       ( 2 )  
 
                                                 
4 However, Markusen and Maskus (2001) using aggregate US data,  found a positive relationship between the host 
country’s trade costs and the affiliate exports back to the home country. They interpret this finding as evidence of 
export platform FDI, where the firm’s locational choice is dictated by the desire to cater to third markets.  
5 The indicators are real GDP growth, GDP per capita, total exports as a percentage of GDP, telephone lines and mobile 
phones per 1000 inhabitants, per capita commercial energy use, R&D spending as a percentage of GDP, tertiary 
enrolment, country risk, exports of natural resources as a percentage of world total, exports in services as a percentage 
of world total, inward FDI stock.    13
where Y is GDP, PI is the UNCTAD potential index of inward FDI and τ is a measure of trade 
barriers. Note that a high level of PI indicates that the country is not relatively attractive as a 
destination of FDI. We expect therefore β < 0 (countries with high PI are unattractive to foreign 
investors) and γ < 0 (if vertical FDI is predominant). Here too, details about estimation methods and 
data sources are relegated to the appendix. Suffice to say that the sample includes only developing 
countries. Industrial countries are excluded on the ground that inward FDI there is still motivated by 
market seeking considerations and, accordingly, is encouraged by high trade barriers (Navaretti, 
Haaland, and Venables, 2003)
6. Furthermore, we focus only on the nineties, where efficiency 
seeking FDI has been playing an increasingly relevant role 
7. Overall, therefore, given that we 
exclude industrial countries (where horizontal FDI is still very relevant) and focus only on the 
nineties (when vertical FDI became more relevant) our expectations is to find that trade barriers 
discourage FDI, i.e. that γ < 0. As a measure of τ we take the sum of tariff barriers and the ad 
valorem equivalent of non tariff barriers.  
 
The results are strikingly simple (table 4). First, as expected, the index of potential FDI is 
negatively associated with the GDP share of inward FDI (recall that a high level of PI means that 
the country is not very attractive as a host to FDI). Second, trade barriers discourage, and 
significantly so, inward FDI. The results are robust to the inclusion of regional fixed effects. They 
suggest that vertical FDI has indeed been the predominant mode of investment internationalization 
toward developing countries during the nineties.  
 
We have also tried to extend our analysis to earlier periods. Unfortunately, the UNCTAD index is 
not available before the nineties. We had to run therefore a more complex regression controlling for 
(some of) the main factors that are thought to affect the attractiveness of FDI. Moreover, we are less 
optimistic in our quest to find a significant impact of trade barriers on FDI given that for earlier 
periods the three motivations – resource, market and efficiency seeking -  were even more all 
present confounding therefore the impact of trade restrictions. The new regression is: 
 
 
τ α α α α α α 5 4 3 2 1 0 ) ln( + + + + + = pc FDI Y PK HK K
Y
FDI
   (3) 
 
                                                 
6 Inappropriate pooling of industrial and developing countries can strongly bias the results. See Blongen and Wang 
(2004). 
7 The index PI is available only for the nineties.   14
where KFDI denotes the ratio of inward FDI stock to GDP, HK  and PK are two measures of the 
stock of human and physical capital respectively, Ypc is income per capita and τ denotes as usually 
the size of trade barriers. As a measure of the stock of human capital, we use the average number of 
school years per inhabitant, as recently updated by Barro and Lee (2000). As a proxy for physical 
capital, we take the number of telephone lines per 1000 inhabitants. Finally, for trade barriers we 
only have indicators of tariff restrictions. The ad valorem equivalent of NTB’s that were used in 
table 4 are available only for the nineties and not for earlier periods.  
 
Three facts stand out (table 5). First, and perhaps not unexpectedly, trade barriers have no clear 
impact on FDI decisions, when a longer period is considered, presumably reflecting the wider 
variety of motivations of multinational firms. Second, the availability of both physical and human 
capital encourages inward FDI, confirming that multinational firms are attracted by the presence of 
a skilled labour force and of adequate infrastructures. The role of human capital is particular 
notable, as it confirms the conjecture in much of the literature (Blomstrom and Kokko, 2003, 
Borensztein et al., 1998) that it is not simply the availability of low wage unskilled labour that 
attracts foreign investors.  
 
By and large, therefore, our results so far show that FDI toward developing countries has become 
increasingly motivated by efficiency considerations. Both progress in communication technology 
and lower trade barriers have contributed to the international fragmentation of the value added chain 
along efficiency lines. Furthermore, we find that the availability of a pool of educated workers is 
also a key consideration in the location decision of multinational firms in developing countries. This 
latter finding raises an intriguing possibility. Consider the case where investment in human capital 
is encouraged by the presence of foreign investors. We may then well have two equilibria, one with 
a limited presence of foreign firms and poor educational achievements, the other with a large stock 
of foreign capital and strong educational levels. We explore this possibility in the next section. 
Before that, however, we turn to the relationship between trade and migration.  
 
 
c) trade policy and migration 
 
Trade policy can also affect the mobility of people and workers. For instance, restrictive trade 
measures in industrial countries will discourage exports from developing countries and strengthen 
the push factors of migration. They will also encourage the expansion of low skill intensive import   15
substituting sectors in receiving countries, thereby reinforcing the pull factors of immigration. On 
both counts, therefore, migration pressure will increase. These effects are evident for instance for 
the Common Agricultural Policy of the EU. By discouraging the expansion of agricultural exports 
from Northern African countries, they foster out-migration. Conversely, the disproportionate size of 
the agricultural sector in the EU acts as magnet for would be migrants. 
 
Some further evidence in this respect comes from the sectoral allocation of migrants in receiving 
countries. Faini and Venturini (1993) show that by and large immigrants are more likely to be 
employed in import competing sectors.  
 
Trade restrictions in sending countries are also likely to encourage out-migration. There is only very 
limited evidence in this respect, however. Faini, Grether and de Melo (1999) show, with the help of 
a simple simulation model, that in a Ricardo Viner framework trade liberalization will have fairly 
complex effects on out-migration. In particular, if exports respond slowly to the new trade regime, 
then trade liberalization will be accompanied by a relatively strong real exchange rate depreciation 
that will foster out-migration. Historical evidence by Collins, O’Rourke, and Williamson (1999) is 
also compatible with the notion that trade and migration may have been complements, at least in the 
nineteenth century.  
 
The plausibility of a complementarity relationship between migration and trade is also strengthened 
by the growing role of service trade. For, many services must be delivered personally. Moreover, 
even tradeable services often require skilled or at least trained personnel to be relocated, most likely 
temporarily, in the importing country.  
 
Overall, also the relationship between trade and migration is not unambiguous. While 
substitutability may have been for most of the post war period the rule rather than the exception, the 





5. Foreign investment, investment in human capital and the brain drain 
 
a) does FDI boost the incentive to invest in human capital?   16
 
We have seen in the previous section how foreign investment is typically attracted by an adequate 
supply of skilled workers. This raises an intriguing question. How are the incentives for human 
capital accumulation affected by the presence of foreign firms? Existing evidence shows that by and 
large foreign firms employ relatively more skilled labour than their domestic counterparts (Barba 
Navaretti and Venables, 2004). Similarly, Feenstra and Hanson (1996a, 1996b) showed, in a fairly 
influential set of papers, that foreign direct investment may raise the relative demand for skills both 
in the home and in the host country 
8. We would then expect the incentive to acquire further 
education to be strengthened by a sufficiently large presence of foreign firms.  
 
For the purpose of illustration, consider a simple model where (foreign) capital accumulation (IPK)  
is negatively related to its own stock (PK) but positively related to the stock of human capital (HK). 
The previous section offered some supporting evidence for both of these conjectures
9. Similarly, we 
assume that investment in human capital (IHK)  is negatively affected by its own stock but is 
encouraged by the presence of foreign investment. Formally: 
 




) , ( HK PK g I HK =  with gPK > 0 and gHK  < 0      (5) 
 
This admittedly simple model is amenable to a graphical representation (fig. 8). In a steady state 
equilibrium - we assume that the standard conditions for such an equilibrium to exist are fulfilled – 
we have that  IHK = IPK  = 0.   Given our assumptions (fHK  > 0 and  gPK > 0 ) , both schedules are 
positively sloped. For instance, an increase in PK will discourage investing in physical capital and 
will need to be offset by a rise in HK.  
 
The fact that both schedules IHK = 0 and IPK  = 0 are positively sloped raises the possibility of 
multiple equilibria. In fig. 8 we depict three of those. The middle one is unstable, the other two are 
stable. We see therefore the emergence of a low level trap (point A in the figure) where foreign 
                                                 
8 This is simply because the goods whose production is relocated to the South are skill intensive for the South but 
unskilled intensive for the North.  
9 The derivative of FDI with respect to the stock of foreign capital is likely to be negative for reasonable values of the 
depreciation parameter.   17
firms are discouraged from investing in the host country because of the inadequate supply of human 
capital there, while the limited presence of foreign firms reduces the demand for skills and 
discourages investment in education.  
 
Is this an empirically  plausible scenario? For an affirmative answer, we still need to show that 
investment in education is encouraged by the presence of foreign firms. To ascertain this possibility, 
we ran a simple econometric equation with the view to explaining the level of educational 
enrolment at the secondary and the tertiary levels. We take this variable as a reasonable proxy of 
investment in human capital, IHK.  
 
We then postulate that investment in human capital is a function of: a) per capita income, with a 
positive relationship provided that education is, as it should, a normal good; b) trade policy, with a 
priori ambiguous impact on IHK.  In the standard model of trade with two factors (skilled and 
unskilled labour), trade liberalization in a unskilled abundant country should penalize skilled labour 
and hence discourage investing in human capital. However, the analyses of Feenstra and Hanson 
(1996a, 1996b) suggest that this may not always be the case, with trade liberalization  boosting 
instead the returns to skills and the incentives to education in both skilled abundant and skilled 
scarce countries
10; c) the endowment of natural resources, to allow for the possibility that the 
abundance of  natural resources may discourage investing in human capital; and d) the presence of 









HK denotes investment in human capital at the secondary or tertiary level (i=secondary, 
tertiary), KFDI is the stock of foreign direct investment over the host country GDP, Ypc is income per 
capita, τ is the level of tariffs, and DNR is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if natural 
resources exports account for more than 40% of total exports.  
 
The results for secondary school enrolment are presented in table 6. As expected, we find that 
income per capita is positively associated with  secondary school enrolment, while a large 
endowment of natural resources has a negative impact on I
S
HK. Interestingly enough, both trade 
liberalization and the presence of foreign firms raise investment in human capital at the secondary 
                                                 
10 See also Schiff and Wang (2004) for a similar result for Latin America   18
school level, thereby supporting the notion that the accumulation of human capital responds 
favourably to a more liberal trade and foreign investment regime. This is a key result for the 
purpose of our analysis. It shows that foreign capital has a significant and positive impact on 
investment in education, as we indeed conjectured in eq. (5) and in fig. (8) . Taken together with our 
earlier finding that a well educated workforce is a crucial factor to attract foreign investors, it 
highlights the existence of a complementarity relationship between FDI and human capital. By and 
large, therefore, the existence of a low level trap, where the lack of foreign capital and of an 
educated workforce feed on each other, is something more than a mere theoretical possibility. In 
addition, our results are consistent with the findings of Feenstra and Hanson (1996a, 1996b) that 
FDI raises the returns to education. 
 
We have also ran the same equation separately for the five main geographical regions, Africa, Asia, 
developing Europe, Latin America and the Middle East. Interestingly enough, the regional estimates 
suggest that the previous results hold also for all the main regions, with just one exception, namely 
the Middle East. The predominance of resource seeking FDI in such a region may explain why 
neither the stock of foreign direct investment nor trade liberalization have a positive effect on the 
incentives to accumulate human capital. 
 
We now turn to tertiary school enrolment. Econometric results are presented in table 7. They are 
quite similar to those for secondary school enrolment except for the fact that now trade policy is no 
longer a significant influence on educational investment for the pooled specification. Running the 
equation separately for the five main developing regions confirms the finding that the Middle East 
is an outlier, with the stock of foreign direct investment having a negative impact on tertiary 
enrolment. Trade liberalization raises investment in education at the tertiary level for Latin America 
and Africa, but not for the other areas.  
 
Overall, the results in this section suggest that trade liberalization has a twofold effect on 
investment in human capital. First, the lifting of trade restrictions attracts foreign firms and, 
accordingly, raises the demand and the returns to skills. Second, trade liberalization itself has a 
positive impact on the incentive to invest in human capital, at least for secondary school. In terms of 
figure 8, trade liberalization would shift the IHK = 0 schedule to the right, with two main 
implications. First, it would raise the steady state levels of both human and foreign capital. Second, 
the rightward shift, if sufficiently large,  of the IHK = 0  schedule may eliminate the low level 
equilibrium altogether. In both cases, the economic and welfare effects are likely to be positive.    19
 
Perhaps more crucially, our results show that also education and FDI policies are complements. 
Opening up the economy to foreign capital increases the incentive to invest in education, which in 
turn further strengthens the attractiveness of the host economy to FDI. Conversely, any 
strengthening in the quality of educational facilities would have a positive impact on the steady 




b) the brain drain: a curse or a blessing? 
 
We have so far focussed on trade and foreign direct investment, neglecting labour mobility. 
However, the previous set-up lends itself quite easily to an analysis of the effects of skilled 
migration. Suppose to begin with that, prompted by the unexpected opening of industrial countries 
borders to highly educated immigration, the sending country suffers from a a sudden loss in its 
skilled labour force. Let the initial equilibrium be at C, where both the human and the foreign 
capital stock are relatively large. Neither the IHK = 0 nor the IPK  = 0 schedules would shift. The new 
(temporary) equilibrium would then be at a point like D, but the equilibrium would slowly move 
back to its original position. There is one case, though, where this may not happen. In particular, if 
the initial loss of skilled workers is large enough, then the economy may shift from the ‘good’ 
equilibrium to the low level trap in A.  
 
Even abstracting from such a dramatic outcome, the effects of the brain drain are unlikely to be 
positive. Consider for instance the case where we model the brain drain in a somewhat different 
way, as leading to a steady loss of skilled workers that migrate abroad. In a sense, the investment in 
human capital has become less productive because of higher depreciation (i.e. emigration) of the 
existing stock of human capital. Formally, this amounts to make the IHK = 0 steeper with a twofold 
effect. First, the steady state levels of both human and physical capital will decline. Second, the 
probability that the economy remains trapped in the low level equilibrium at A will increase. 
Independently of how we model the impact of brain drain, its impact on the sending country’s 
economic welfare  is likely to be negative. 
 
Our assessment of the impact of the brain may however be a bit too gloomy. A recent stream of 
literature has argued that in the end the brain drain may not be as bad as previously thought for the   20
sending country. The reason is simple. So far, we have treated the brain drain as a purely exogenous 
phenomenon with no impact on the behaviour of domestic agents. This approach however may be a 
bit too restrictive. Suppose that the returns to skills are higher abroad, say because of better 
technology. Consider the case where the foreign country opens up its border to skilled immigration, 
so that home country educated residents have now a positive probability, say p > 0, to move abroad. 
Clearly, the expected return to education will rise, as it will now be equal to a weighted average of 
the higher return abroad and the initial return at home and, as a result, investment in education will 
also increase. If the latter effect is large enough it may offset the loss of skills due the brain drain 
and allow the country to retain a larger pool of educated workers compared to the no migration 
case. In such a circumstance, the brain drain becomes a brain gain (Stark et al., 1997, 1998; 
Mountford, 1998).  
 
Is this outcome empirically plausible? The evidence on the education boosting effect of the brain 
drain is quite limited, also because of the paucity of data on the size of skilled migration. While the 
gap has been partly filled by the Carrington and Detragiache (1998), their work focus almost 
exclusively on the US and make generalizations to other receiving countries quite tenuous. Recent 
work by Adams (2003) provides only a few additional observations. 
 
Notwithstanding these limitations, there have been in the literature of number of attempts to assess 
whether the possibility of migrating abroad effectively boosts the investment in education. The 
evidence is mixed, with both Beine et al. (2003) and Faini (2004) finding some positive but 
relatively weak effects of the brain on secondary enrolment. Faini (2004) actually finds that the 
probability of tertiary migration actually depresses tertiary enrolment, a finding that he attributes to 
the choice by would be migrants to pursue their graduate studies abroad. 
 
In what follows we have tried to take a further shot at the issue. We combine the data set of 
Carrington and Detragiache (1998) and of Adams (2003). We then augment the equation for I
i
HK 
with a variable p






HK p D Y K I 5 4 3 2 1 0 ) ln( α α τ α α α α + + + + + =    (7) 
 
As a measure of p
i we take the migration rate for workers with educational level equal to i.  The 
results are presented in Table 8. They are far less than encouraging. Due to the limited number of   21
observations for p
i, the size of the sample shrinks dramatically. We drop the natural resource 
dummy, as it is never significant. Per capita income is the only significant determinant of secondary 
school enrolment. The stock of foreign capital has the expected positive sign but is not statistically 
different from zero at standard significance levels. For tertiary school enrolment, the tariff rate 
enters again the equation, as it did in table 8, with a negative coefficient, suggesting that trade 
protection discourages investment in human capital. The noticeable fact though is that the 
probability of migrating abroad, i.e. the variable p
i, plays no role whatsoever in determining the 
educational choices at either the secondary or the tertiary levels. Moreover, the coefficient on p
i  is 
negative in both equations, contrary to the prediction of the brain gain model. These result should 
be taken with a grain of salt, given the very limited number of degrees of freedom. However, they 
provide no evidence in support of the brain gain argument. 
 
6. Conclusions  
 
The interaction between trade, capital, and labour mobility is a key factor in determining the impact 
of globalization on developing countries. Separate analyses of the effects of trade, migration and 
FDI are increasingly at risk  of missing some key feedbacks between the different facets of 
globalization.  
 
One of the main findings of this paper is that trade liberalization, in addition to its standard and 
somewhat controversial effects on growth, also increase the host country’s attractiveness for foreign 
direct investment. This adds a new channel through which a more liberal trade regime can favour 
growth
11. Moreover, trade liberalization can also boost the investment in education and, hence,  
allow an economy to escape from a low equilibrium trap.  
 
We have also shown how skilled migration can  interact with FDI and the investment in human 
capital to generate a welfare inferior equilibrium, where foreign firms refrain from investing in the 
host country because of its inadequate supply of skills, while the incentives to get educated remain 
weak because of the lack of foreign capital. The brain drain in this set up means that a substantial 
share of  skilled workers will migrate abroad, thereby aggravating the disincentive for foreign 
investors. The possibility that the brain drain may be turned into a brain gain, by raising the returns 
to skills, seems in this context quite remote and, at any rate, is not supported by available evidence.  
                                                 
11 Even though the growth impact of FDI is also controversial in the literature. The findings by Borensztein et al. (1998) 
have been recently challenged by Carkovic and Levine (2002).  
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The policy message is that policy coherence both at the domestic and at the international levels is 
key. International institutions should lead the way in this respect, by better integrating their policy 
advice in the fields of trade, FDI, and migration. National policy makers should make sure that 
different provisions do not work at cross purpose with each other.  
 
Finally, and perhaps more generally, we have seen how complementarities between the different 
aspects of globalization have become increasingly pervasive. This is both good and bad news for 
the world economy. It is good news to the extent that the effects of a more liberal regime tend to be 
mutually reinforcing. It is bad news when backtracking in one area feeds negatively on other areas. 
The concerns about the recent trends in globalization and in the policy stance may be exaggerated. 
However, a far greater risk is to underestimate the risks to the liberalization of trade, investment -  
and perhaps one day also migration -  regimes.   23
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Table 1 
 
Stock of foreign population in OECD countries 
(as a percentage of total population) 
 
 1990  2000 
United States  7.9  10.4 
Japan 0.9  1.3 
France 6.3  5.6 
Germany 8.4  8.9 
Italy 1.4  2.4 
UK 3.2  4.0 
Belgium 9.1  8.4 
 





The Brain Drain  
 
Migration rates by educational attainments 
 
(percentage of host country’s educational group) 
 
  To the US  To the OECD 
Origin country  Secondary educ.  Tertiary educ.  Secondary educ. Tertiary educ. 
Korea 1.2  5.7  3.3  14.9 
Philippines  4.4 6.6 6.0 9.0 
Ghana  0.3 15.1 0.7 25.7 
Uganda  0.6 15.4 0.6 15.5 
Domin.  Rep.  29.7 14.2 30.5 14.7 
Guatemala 29.1 13.5 29.1 13.5 
Colombia  3.6 5.6 3.8 5.6 
Mexico  20.9 10.3 20.9 10.3 
 





Openness and trade policy 
 
Dep. Variable: [(X+M)/Y]t,t+4 
 
 (1)  (2) 
ln (Ypc)t  13.1 (4.3)  9.30 (2.2) 
ln (pop)t  -12.4 (6.5)  -12.4 (6.8) 
τt  -0.20 (2.01)  -- 
ln τt  -- -12.7  (4.5) 
χ
2(7) 654.5  780.9 
R
2  0.47 0.56 
N. of observations  206  194 
 
Legends: 
X: exports, M: imports, Y: GDP, Ypc : per capita income, pop : population, τ : tariff rate   28
Table 4 
FDI and trade policy 
 
 
Dep. Var: [FDI/Y]t,t+4 
 
 (1)  (2) 
PIFDI  -1.04 (1.80)  -1.58 (2.28) 
ln τ  -1.23 (2.5)  -1.03 (1.95) 
Wald test χ
2(2) 20.4  27.5 
Hausman test [χ
2(4)]   4.34 
Estimation method  FE  RE 
χ
2(4) for regional dummies  --  6.16 
R
2  0.35 0.40 
N. of observations  61  61 
Regional dummies  no  yes 
 
Legends:  
FDI: foreign direct investment, Y: GDP, PIFDI: potential for FDI, τ: trade barriers. 
FE: fixed effects estimator, RE: random effect estimator   29
Table 5 
FDI, human capital, and trade policy 
 
 
Dep. Var: [FDI/Y]t,t+4 
 
 (1)  (2) 
KFDI/Y  0.05 (1.94)  0.07 (3.06) 
HK  0.94 (2.26)  0.87 (2.2) 
PK  0.01 (2.1)  0.01 (1.33) 
ln (Ypc)  -1.01 (0.71)  -0.5 (0.4) 
  τ 0.01  (0.5)  -- 
ln τ --  0.05  (0.1) 
F(5,70) 6.13  7.4 
Hausman test                       9.3 [χ
2(4)] 9.6  [χ
2(5)] 
Estimation method  FE  FE 
R
2  0.17 0.40 
N. of observations  140  130 
Regional dummies  No  No 
 
Legends:  
KFDI: stock of foreign direct investment, Y: GDP, τ: tariff rate, HK: average years of schooling 
(human capital), PK: telephone lines per 1000 inhabitants (physical capital), Ypc : per capita income 
FE: fixed effects, RE: random effects 
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Table 6 
The determinants of secondary school enrolment 
 
Dep. Var: [SSE]t 
 
  Full sample  Africa  Asia  Europe  Latin Am.  Middle 
East 
KFDI/Y  0.34 (5.5)  0.22 (1.3)  0.75 (5.3)  0.32 (2.4)  0.3 (2.8)  -0.3 (0.7) 
ln (Ypc)  17.7 (3.2)  7.9 (1.2)  5.8 (1.0)  42.5 (4.0)  11 (1.7)  11.5 (0.7) 
ln τ  -6.24 (5.4)  -4.9 (1.90)  -4.9 (1.57) -3.4 (1.0)  -9.5 (5.0)  -1.5 (0.3) 
DNR  -3.0 (2.2)  -7.3 (3.1)  -5.3 (2.1)  -7.2 (1.2)  1.7 (0.7)  0.5 (0.1) 
F(m,n)  41 (4,286)  5.3 (4,60)  23 (4,62)  10 (4,33)  14 (4,101)  0.7 (4,14) 
Hausman test    19 [χ
2(4)] --  --  --  --  -- 
Estim.  method FE  FE  FE FE FE FE 
R
2  0.51  0.72  0.14 0.29 0.31 0.22 
N. of observations  378  91  80  53  127  27 
Regional 
dummies 
No  No  No No No No 
 
Legends 
SSE: secondary school enrolment, KFDI: stock of foreign direct investment, Y: GDP, τ: tariff rate, 
DNR: dummy for natural resource abundant country, Ypc : per capita income 
FE: fixed effects, RE: random effects   31
Table 7 
The determinants of tertiary school enrolment 
 
Dep. Var: [TSE]t 
 
  Full sample  Africa  Asia  Europe  Latin Am.  Middle 
East 
KFDI/Y  0.12 (3.4)  0.12 (3.8)  -0.15 (1.1) 0.44 (5.3)  0.11 (3.1)  -0.7 (1.84) 
ln (Ypc)  14.6 (8.3)  5.4 (4.5)  23 (4.2)  41 (6.5)  7.1 (2.9)  6.3 (0.5) 
ln τ  0.2 (0.3)  -1.4 (3.1)  2.2 (1.1)  1.5 (0.8)  -2.1 (2.8)  -1.4 (0.4) 
DNR  -1.6 (2.1)  -1.3  (2.9)  -0.9 (0.5)  2.3 (0.6)  1.1 (1.2)  -12 (3.5) 
F(m,n)  29 (4,313)  17 (4,75)  9.1 (4,65)  30 (4,34)  12 (4,109)  4.5 (4,15) 
Hausman test    81 [χ
2(5)] --  --  --  --  -- 
Estim.  Method FE  FE  FE FE FE FE 
R
2  0.38  0.69  0.57 0.15 0.17 0.33 
N. of observations  408  106  83  55  136  28 
Regional 
dummies 
No  No  No No No No 
 
Legends 
TSE: tertiary school enrolment, KFDI: stock of foreign direct investment, Y: GDP, τ: tariff rate, DNR: 
dummy for natural resource abundant country, Ypc : per capita income 
FE: fixed effects, RE: random effects   32
Table 8 
Educational achievements and the brain drain 
 
  Secondary school enrolment  Tertiary school enrolment 
KFDI/Y  0.18 (1.26)  -0.06 (0.98) 
ln (Ypc)  22.8 (7.1)  8.4 (5.97) 
ln τ  -1.41 (0.4)  -3.73 (2.4) 
p
i  -0.06 (0.3)  -0.07 (1.4) 
Estimation method  RE  RE 
Hausman test [χ
2(4)] 3.56  3.46 
R
2  0.52 0.54 
Number of observations  47  50 
 
Legends 
KFDI: stock of foreign direct investment, Y: GDP, τ: tariff rate, abundant country, Ypc : per capita 
income, p
i: migration rate for educational group i  
FE: fixed effects, RE: random effects   33
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Figure 2
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Figure 3






























Africa Asia Europe Middle East Latin America
Figure 4
 Openness in developing countries
1980-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000
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Figure 5
Inward FDI as a percentage of GDP 
1980-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000
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Figure 6
Average tariff rates
1980-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000
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Figure 7
Ad valorem equivalents of non-tariff barriers 
1990 1995 2000  40
Figure 8 
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Appendix 
 
All equations have been first estimated with a random effect estimator. The Hausman test was used 
to assess whether the unobservable random effects were correlated with the regressors. If so, the 
equation was re-estimated with a fixed effect estimator 
 
Regional dummies have been added to each equation. Their joint significance was tested. They are 
not included in the fixed effect estimation.  
 
In all but one equation, the dependent variable is measured by its average value over a five year 
period (1981-1985, 1986-1990, 1991-1995, 1996-2000). For right hand side variables, we take their 
value at the beginning of the relevant five year period.  
 





FDI (flows and stocks): UNCTAD data base 
Tariff rates: World Bank 
Openness (in constant prices): Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002)  
GDP per capita in PPP: Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002)  
Population: Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002)  
Tertiary and secondary school enrolment: World Bank 
Telephone lines: World Bank 
Years of schooling: Barro and Lee (2000) 
 